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OPINION OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
This appeal presents two issues of first impression in 
our Court concerning the Internal Revenue Service’s 
assessment of civil penalties for violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5314 
and its implementing regulations, which require certain 
persons annually to file a Report of Foreign Bank and 
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Financial Accounts (colloquially called a “FBAR” or simply 
“Report”).  First, we examine federal court jurisdiction over 
actions challenging the IRS’s assessment of civil FBAR 
penalties.  We conclude that jurisdiction exists here but 
reserve the question whether it is established in the District 
Court when a taxpayer files suit to challenge a FBAR penalty 
before fully paying it.  Second, we clarify that, to prove a 
“willful” FBAR violation, the Government must satisfy the 
civil willfulness standard, which includes both knowing and 
reckless conduct.  To ensure this action accords with that 
standard, we remand for further proceedings consistent with 
our opinion.  
I.  Background 
A. Legal Background 
Congress passed the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 to 
require certain reports and records that may be useful in 
“criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings, or 
in the conduct of intelligence or counterintelligence activities 
. . . .”  31 U.S.C. § 5311.  One provision of the Act, 31 U.S.C. 
§ 5314, instructs the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe 
rules that require persons to file an annual report identifying 
certain transactions or relations with foreign financial 
agencies.  The Secretary has implemented this statute through 
various regulations, including 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350, which 
specifies that certain United States persons must annually file 
a Report with the IRS.  Covered persons must file it by June 
30 each year for foreign accounts exceeding $10,000 in the 
prior calendar year.  31 C.F.R. § 1010.306(c).  The authority 
to enforce the FBAR requirement has been delegated to the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.  Id. § 1010.810(g); see 
also Internal Revenue Manual § 4.26.1, Ex. 4.26.1-3 (U.S. 
Dep’t of Treasury Memorandum of Agreement and 
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Delegation of Authority for Enforcement of FBAR 
Requirements). 
The civil penalties for a FBAR violation are in 31 
U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5).  The maximum penalty for a non-willful 
violation is $10,000.  Id. § 5321(a)(5)(B)(i).  By contrast, the 
maximum penalty for a willful violation is the greater of 
$100,000 or 50% of the balance in the unreported foreign 
account at the time of the violation.  Id. § 5321(a)(5)(C)(i). 
B. Facts and Procedural History  
Plaintiff-appellee Arthur Bedrosian is a successful 
businessman who has worked in the pharmaceutical industry 
since the late 1960s.  By 1973 he had opened a savings 
account in Switzerland so that he could make purchases while 
traveling abroad for work without relying solely on traveler’s 
checks to do so.  Bedrosian initially used the account for 
convenient access to funds while traveling abroad, but in later 
years he began to use it more as a savings account.  Union 
Bank of Switzerland (“UBS”) thereafter acquired the bank 
where Bedrosian had opened his account, which caused the 
account to become a UBS account.   
From 1973 until 2007 Bedrosian used the services of 
accountant Seymour Handelman to prepare his income tax 
returns.  Sometime in the 1990s according to Bedrosian, he 
informed Handelman for the first time that he maintained a 
bank account in Switzerland.  Handelman told Bedrosian that 
he had been breaking the law every year he did not report the 
Swiss account to the IRS.  Handelman also told him that his 
estate could deal with the consequences after he was dead.  
With this advice, Bedrosian continued not to report his UBS 
account when he filed his annual tax returns. 
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In 2005 UBS approached Bedrosian and proposed that 
it loan him 750,000 Swiss Francs and convert his savings 
account into an investment account.  Bedrosian accepted the 
proposal, and the loan transaction that followed resulted in 
the creation of a second account under Bedrosian’s control at 
UBS.  
In 2007 Handelman died, and Bedrosian began filing 
his taxes through a new accountant, Sheldon Bransky.  In 
preparation, Bedrosian authorized Bransky to obtain his 
records from Handelman’s offices and gave Bransky the same 
materials that he was accustomed to giving Handelman in 
prior years.  Bransky then prepared Bedrosian’s 2007 tax 
return, on which he indicated that Bedrosian owned a foreign 
bank account.  Bransky also prepared a FBAR for Bedrosian, 
which identified one of Bedrosian’s two accounts at UBS.  
The account identified had assets totaling approximately 
$240,000; the account omitted had assets totaling 
approximately $2 million.  
At trial Bedrosian testified that he had no recollection 
of discussing his Swiss bank accounts with Bransky.  
Bedrosian also testified that he did not know how Bransky 
knew to acknowledge the existence of a foreign bank account 
on the tax return or how Bransky knew to prepare the Report.  
Bedrosian also did not review the 2007 tax return and Report.  
He simply signed them.  
After submitting these documents for tax year 2007, 
Bedrosian became more aware of the seriousness of not 
reporting foreign bank accounts to the IRS.  After seeking 
legal counsel, he began correcting the inaccuracies on his 
prior tax filings.  Nonetheless, in April 2011 the IRS notified 
Bedrosian that it would audit his recent tax returns. 
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In January 2015 the IRS assessed against Bedrosian a 
penalty for “willful” failure to disclose the larger UBS 
account on his 2007 Report.  The penalty assessed was equal 
to the statutory maximum of $975,789, i.e., 50% of the 
undisclosed account.  Bedrosian paid $9,757.89 (one percent 
of the penalty assessed) and then filed a complaint in the 
District Court seeking to recover his $9,757.89 payment as an 
unlawful exaction.  The Government answered Bedrosian’s 
complaint and filed a counterclaim for the allegedly full 
penalty amount of $1,007,345, which included interest and a 
late-payment penalty.  
In the District Court, the only disputed issue on the 
merits was whether Bedrosian’s failure to disclose his 
$2 million UBS account on his 2007 Report was “willful.”  
The Court held a one-day bench trial to resolve the issue.  
After trial it issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
concluding that the Government had failed to establish 
Bedrosian’s Report violation was willful.  Accordingly, the 
Court entered judgment in favor of Bedrosian both on his 
claim against the Government and on its counterclaim against 
him.  The Government appeals to us.  
II.  Jurisdiction 
The parties contend we have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 to review the District Court’s entry of final 
judgment.  But we have “an independent duty to satisfy 
ourselves of our appellate jurisdiction regardless of the 
parties’ positions.”  Papotto v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 
731 F.3d 265, 269 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Kreider Dairy 
Farms, Inc. v. Glickman, 190 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 1999)).  
The jurisdictional inquiry in this case is a matter of 
first impression.  Unlike most cases involving the IRS’s 
assessment of a civil FBAR penalty, in which the IRS files 
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suit to recover the penalty, this case began when Bedrosian 
paid one percent of the assessed penalty and then filed a 
complaint in the District Court seeking to recover his partial 
payment.  The Government did not challenge that Court’s 
jurisdiction over Bedrosian’s claim; as noted, it instead 
answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim seeking the 
full penalty amount. 
The parties contend the District Court had jurisdiction 
over Bedrosian’s claim under the so-called Little Tucker Act, 
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), which provides district courts with 
original jurisdiction, concurrent with the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims, over certain claims against the United States not 
exceeding $10,000 in amount, including certain claims 
“founded . . . upon the Constitution . . . or [an] Act of 
Congress.”  The parties contend Bedrosian’s claim qualified 
for jurisdiction under the Little Tucker Act because it did not 
exceed $10,000 in amount (Bedrosian’s initial claim seeking to 
recover his partial payment of $9,757.89) and was founded on 
the FBAR statute, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5314 & 5321. 
We decline to hold that Bedrosian’s initial claim 
against the Government gains jurisdiction under the Little 
Tucker Act.  A claim may qualify only if it does not fall 
within the scope of the so-called tax refund statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1346(a)(1).  See id. § 1346(a)(2) (applying to claims “other” 
than those within 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1)).  The tax refund 
statute encompasses, among other things, claims to seek 
recovery of any “penalty” that is wrongfully collected “under 
the internal-revenue laws.”  Id. § 1346(a)(1).  The parties 
concede that a civil penalty under the FBAR statute is a 
“penalty” under § 1346(a)(1), but they contend it was not 
assessed “under the internal-revenue laws” because the FBAR 
statute, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5314 & 5321, is in Title 31 of the U.S. 
Code, not Title 26 (the Internal Revenue Code).  We are 
skeptical of this argument’s elevation of form over substance, 
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and, for reasons stated in the margin, we are inclined to 
believe that Bedrosian’s initial claim did not qualify for 
district court jurisdiction at all.1 
                                              
1 The parties’ argument that Bedrosian’s claim is not within 
the tax refund statute is premised on the notion that the phrase 
“internal-revenue laws” in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) refers only 
to laws codified in Title 26 of the U.S. Code.  But that 
argument does not follow the statutory history of the tax 
refund statute, which suggests that “internal-revenue laws” 
are defined by their function and not their placement in the 
U.S. Code.  See Wyodak Res. Dev. Corp. v. United States, 
637 F.3d 1127, 1134 (10th Cir. 2011).  The argument also 
ignores the Tax Court’s rejection of the proposition that 
“internal revenue laws are limited to laws codified in [T]itle 
26.”  See Whistleblower 21276–13W v. Comm’r, 147 T.C. 
121, 130 & n.13 (2016) (noting that “the IRS itself 
acknowledges that tax laws may be found outside title 26”).  
We also observe, by analogy, that claims brought by 
taxpayers to recover penalties assessed under 26 U.S.C. 
§ 6038(b) for failing to report holdings of foreign 
companies—a statute nearly identical to the FBAR statute, 
except addressing foreign business holdings rather than 
foreign bank accounts—are brought under the tax refund 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1).  See Dewees v. United States, 
2017 WL 8185850, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 3, 2017).  Also, 
allowing a taxpayer to seek recovery of a FBAR penalty 
under the Little Tucker Act permits that person to seek a 
ruling on that penalty in federal district court without first 
paying the entire penalty, as Bedrosian did here by paying 
just under the $10,000 Little Tucker Act threshold.  This 
violates a first principle of tax litigation in federal district 
court—“pay first and litigate later.”  Flora v. United States, 
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Nonetheless, even if Bedrosian’s initial claim was not 
within the Court’s original jurisdiction for Bedrosian’s 
complaint, it had the authority to act by virtue of the 
Government’s counterclaim, which supplied jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1345.  See Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 
657 F.2d 535, 539 (3d Cir. 1981) (“[A] jurisdictional defect in 
the complaint will not preclude adjudication of a 
counterclaim over which the court has an independent basis 
of jurisdiction.”).  We therefore have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the District Court’s final 
judgment, unless another statute takes away our jurisdiction. 
Given the potential implication of the Little Tucker 
Act, we consider whether our jurisdiction is removed in this 
case by the statute governing the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  See Chabal v. 
Reagan, 822 F.2d 349, 355 (3d Cir. 1987).  We are satisfied 
that it is not.  Under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2), the Federal 
Circuit generally has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from 
cases in which a district court’s jurisdiction was based, in 
whole or in part, on the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1346(a)(2), unless the claim stemmed from “an Act of 
Congress or a regulation of an executive department 
providing for internal revenue.”  28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2).  
Although the statute does not define “providing for internal 
revenue,” we take guidance from courts that have construed 
                                                                                                     
362 U.S. 145, 164 (1960).  We are inclined to believe the 
initial claim of Bedrosian was within the scope of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1346(a)(1) and thus did not supply the District Court with 
jurisdiction at all because he did not pay the full penalty 
before filing suit, as would be required to establish 
jurisdiction under subsection (a)(1).  See Flora, 362 U.S. at 
176–77.  But given the procedural posture of this case, we 
leave a definitive holding on this issue for another day. 
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this same phrase in 28 U.S.C. § 1340, the only other federal 
statute that employs the same language.2  In keeping with 
those courts, we construe the phrase “providing for internal 
revenue” broadly to encompass all federal statutes and 
regulations that are “part of the machinery for the collection 
of federal taxes.”  United States v. Coson, 286 F.2d 453, 455–
56 (9th Cir. 1961) (quotation omitted); see also Aqua Bar & 
Lounge, Inc. v. United States, 539 F.2d 935, 937 (3d Cir. 
1976) (citing Coson).  (For those who might ask about 
legislative history, there is no meaningful guidance on the 
meaning of “providing for internal revenue” under 
§ 1295(a)(2).)  
Under this construction, we conclude that the FBAR 
statute “provid[es] for internal revenue” within the meaning 
of 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2).  The statute was enacted initially 
as part of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, which was intended 
to promote, among other things, the collection of federal 
taxes.  See 31 U.S.C. § 5311; see also United States v. 
Chabot, 793 F.3d 338, 344 (3d Cir. 2015) (describing the 
purpose of the Bank Secrecy Act:  “for tax collection, 
development of monetary policy, and conducting intelligence 
activities”).  In passing that Act, Congress was particularly 
                                              
2 28 U.S.C. § 1340 provides:  “The district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act 
of Congress providing for internal revenue, or revenue from 
imports or tonnage except matters within the jurisdiction of 
the Court of International Trade.”  As Judge Posner has 
observed, “the elimination of the minimum amount in 
controversy from [28 U.S.C. § 1331] made [28 U.S.C. 
§ 1340] . . . [one of] so many beached whales, yet no one 
thought to repeal those now-redundant statutes.”  Winstead v. 
J.C. Penney Co., 933 F.2d 576, 580 (7th Cir. 1991).  
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concerned with “[s]ecret foreign financial facilities, 
particularly in Switzerland,” that offered the wealthy a 
“grossly unfair” but “convenient avenue of tax evasion.”  
H.R. Rep. No. 91-975 at 13 (1970), reprinted in 1971-1 C.B. 
559, 561.  The IRS has by delegation the authority to enforce 
the FBAR statute and implementing regulations, 
31 C.F.R. § 1010.810(g), and it has developed a 
comprehensive scheme for enforcing and assessing the FBAR 
penalty.  See Internal Revenue Manual §§ 4.26 & 8.11.6.  
Congress further emphasized the tax-related nature of the 
statute by amending its penalty provisions as part of the 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, a piece of tax 
legislation.  Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 821(a), Title VIII, 
Subtitle B, Part I, 118 Stat. 1418, 1586.   
Our take is the FBAR statute is part of the IRS’s 
machinery for the collection of federal taxes; thus it is an act 
“providing for internal revenue” within the meaning of 28 
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2).  Accordingly we conclude the Federal 
Circuit would not have exclusive jurisdiction over this 
appeal even if the District Court’s jurisdiction were based in 
part on the Little Tucker Act.  
Although we leave open whether Bedrosian’s initial 
claim created original jurisdiction in the District Court, we 
are satisfied it had jurisdiction to render the judgment under 
review and we have appellate jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
III.  Discussion  
The District Court’s judgment for Bedrosian was based 
on its ruling that the Government did not prove Bedrosian’s 
failure to file an accurate Report in 2007 was “willful.”  The 
Government raises three distinct claims of error, but we need 
address only one to resolve this appeal—namely, whether 
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the District Court evaluated Bedrosian’s conduct under the 
correct legal standard for willfulness.3 
A. Standard of Review 
There is little on which the parties agree.  This 
includes the applicable standard of review.  Bedrosian 
contends we should review the District Court’s 
determination of non-willfulness for clear error because it 
was an essentially factual determination.  The Government 
counters that we should review de novo the legal analysis 
underlying the District Court’s determination because the 
analysis is a purely legal question.  Par for the course is that 
the parties speak past one another in their analyses, yet the 
issue is nuanced.  
We have not directly addressed what standard of 
review applies to a district court’s willfulness determination 
under the FBAR statute.  In the context of other civil 
penalties, we have held that a district court’s determination 
of willfulness is a primarily factual determination that is 
reviewed for clear error.  See Pignataro v. Port Auth. of N.Y. 
& N.J., 593 F.3d 265, 273 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Whether a 
violation of the FLSA is willful is a question of fact that is 
reviewed for clear error.”).  Similarly, we have held that the 
Tax Court’s determination of willfulness in tax matters is 
                                              
3 The Government’s other two claims of error are that (1) the 
District Court unduly weighed Bedrosian’s subjective 
motivations when assessing willfulness, and (2) it clearly 
erred in finding that Bedrosian did not know he owned a 
second foreign bank account in Switzerland.  Given our 
disposition of the appeal, we need not directly address either 
of these claims and leave it to the District Court if it needs to 
do so on remand.  
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reviewed for clear error.  See Estate of Spear v. Comm’r, 41 
F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 1994).  And the Supreme Court has 
held that clear error review applies to a trial court’s 
determination of “willful neglect” in the context of civil 
penalties for failure to pay federal taxes.  See United States v. 
Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 249 n.8 (1985); accord E. Wind Indus., 
Inc. v. United States, 196 F.3d 499, 504 (3d Cir. 1999).   
We follow suit and hold that a district court’s 
determination in a bench trial as to willfulness under the 
FBAR statute is reviewed for clear error.  Moreover, this 
aligns with a broader line of case law in our Circuit extending 
clear error review to similar factual determinations.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Brown, 631 F.3d 638, 642 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(applying “clear error” review to district court’s 
determination as to police officer’s “reckless disregard for the 
truth”); United States v. Richards, 674 F.3d 215, 223 (3d Cir. 
2012) (whether public official held “high-level decision-
making” or “sensitive” position reviewed for clear error); In 
re Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., 718 F.3d 184, 211 (3d Cir. 
2013) (as “factual issues predominate” in determining 
negligence, clear error review applies).  
On the surface, this should settle the issue.  But not 
quite.  Even when we review a trial court’s primarily factual 
determination under a deferential standard of review, we 
nonetheless have a duty to “correct any legal error infecting 
[the] decision.”  U.S. Bank Nat’l Assoc. ex rel. CWCapital 
Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 960, 
968 n.7 (2018).  For example, if the record suggests a district 
court “somehow misunderstood the nature” of the operative 
inquiry, id., we then decide whether to remand the case to that 
court for clarification of the basis of its determination or, 
alternatively, whether to decide the primarily factual issue 
ourselves.  See Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 
U.S. 379, 381, 387 & n.3 (2008).  In general, the proper 
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course will be remand unless “the record permits only one 
resolution of the factual issue.”  Id. at 387 n.3 (quoting 
Pullman–Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 292 (1982)).  
B. “Willfulness” under the FBAR Statute 
In assessing the inquiry performed by the District 
Court, we first consider its holding that the proper standard 
for willfulness is “the one used in other civil contexts—that 
is, a defendant has willfully violated [31 U.S.C. § 5314] when 
he either knowingly or recklessly fails to file [a] FBAR.”  
(Op. at 7.)  We agree.  Though “willfulness” may have many 
meanings, general consensus among courts is that, in the civil 
context, the term “often denotes that which is intentional, or 
knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental, and 
that it is employed to characterize conduct marked by careless 
disregard whether or not one has the right so to act.”  Wehr v. 
Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 1980) (quoting 
United States v. Illinois Central R.R., 303 U.S. 239, 242–43 
(1938)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In particular, 
where “willfulness” is an element of civil liability, “we have 
generally taken it to cover not only knowing violations of a 
standard, but reckless ones as well.”  Fuges v. Sw. Fin. Servs., 
Ltd., 707 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Safeco Ins. 
Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57 (2007)).  We thus join our 
District Court colleague in holding that the usual civil 
standard of willfulness applies for civil penalties under the 
FBAR statute.  
This holds true as well for recklessness in the context 
of a civil FBAR penalty.  That is, a person commits a reckless 
violation of the FBAR statute by engaging in conduct that 
violates “an objective standard:  action entailing ‘an 
unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so 
obvious that it should be known.’”  Safeco, 551 U.S. at 68 
(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994)).  This 
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holding is in line with other courts that have addressed civil 
FBAR penalties, see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 489 
F. App’x 655, 658 (4th Cir. 2012), as well as our prior cases 
addressing civil penalties assessed by the IRS under the tax 
laws, see, e.g., United States v. Carrigan, 31 F.3d 130, 134 
(3d Cir. 1994).  With respect to IRS filings in particular, a 
person “recklessly” fails to comply with an IRS filing 
requirement when he or she “(1) clearly ought to have known 
that (2) there was a grave risk that [the filing requirement was 
not being met] and if (3) he [or she] was in a position to find 
out for certain very easily.”  Id. (quoting United States v. 
Vespe, 868 F.2d 1328, 1335 (3d Cir. 1989) (internal quotation 
omitted)).  
C. The District Court’s evaluation of Bedrosian’s 
willfulness 
So did the District Court use the proper standard to 
evaluate Bedrosian’s conduct?  It first compared his conduct 
to the conduct of other individuals in recent cases who have 
been the subject of civil FBAR penalties.  Based primarily 
on those comparisons, it concluded that Bedrosian did not 
act willfully.  In doing so, the Court’s discussion and 
distinction of prior FBAR cases imply the ultimate 
determination of non-willfulness was based on findings 
related to Bedrosian’s subjective motivations and the overall 
“egregiousness” of his conduct, which are not required to 
establish willfulness in this context.  
The remainder of the District Court’s opinion does not 
dispel our concern.  Although it discusses whether Bedrosian 
acted knowingly, it did not consider whether, when his 2007 
FBAR filing came due, he “(1) clearly ought to have known 
that (2) there was a grave risk that [an accurate FBAR was 
not being filed] and if (3) he was in a position to find out for 
certain very easily.”  Carrigan, 31 F.3d at 134 (quoting 
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Vespe, 868 F.2d at 1335 (internal quotation omitted)).  The 
Court thus leaves the impression it did not consider whether 
Bedrosian’s conduct satisfies the objective recklessness 
standard articulated in similar contexts. 
Although we would afford clear error review to an 
ultimate determination as to recklessness, we cannot defer to 
a determination we are not sure the District Court made based 
on our view of the correct legal standard.  We therefore 
remand for further consideration and to render a new 
judgment.  See Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. at 381, 387 & n.3. 
* * * * * 
The Federal Circuit does not have exclusive 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2) to review appeals 
from a district court’s final judgment on a claim against the 
Government for recovery of a civil FBAR penalty.  We 
leave open the question whether such a claim, standing 
alone, would be within the original jurisdiction of the district 
courts, at least where the taxpayer has not paid the full 
penalty before filing suit.  We further hold the standard of 
willfulness under the FBAR statute refers to the civil 
willfulness standard, which includes both knowing and 
reckless conduct.  Because we are unsure whether the District 
Court evaluated Bedrosian’s conduct under this objective 
standard, we remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
